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Stained Red: A Study of Stigma by Association to Blacklisted Artists during the "Red Scare" in Hollywood, 1945 to 1960

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Abstract

We suggest that moral panics exert spillover effects through stigma by mere association. Individuals are harmed even if their ties to stigmatized affiliates are heterophilous, and high-status individuals can also suffer. This creates a broadcast effect that increases the scale of the moral panic. Analyzing the U.S. film industry from 1945 to 1960, we examine how artists' employment in feature films was influenced by their associations with co-workers who were blacklisted as communists *after* working with the focal artist. Mere association reduces an artist's chances of working again, and one exposure is enough to impair work prospects. Furthermore, actors' careers are impaired when writers with whom they worked are blacklisted. Moreover, the negative effects of stigma by mere association hold even when the focal artist has received public acclaim. These findings have broad implications. When a few individuals or organizations are engaged in wrongdoing and publicly targeted, stigma by association can lead to false positives and harm many innocents.

Keywords

stigma, moral panics, diffusion, categorization

After World War II, Hollywood was convulsed by widespread fears of communist penetration in the film industry, dubbed the "Red Scare." Congress held hearings and film artists named as suspected communists were blacklisted by studios and deprived of work. Of the 30,000 or so artists employed in Hollywood during this period, fewer than 300 were officially blacklisted, and even fewer posed a threat to the U. S. government. Very few individuals were directly targeted for punitive action. So what were the wider consequences of the Red Scare? This question is of interest not only to film industry historians, but also to cultural and political sociologists and students of social problems.

Hollywood's Red Scare was an instance of moral panic, where activists stigmatize

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a group as abnormal and deviant. The public perceives this group as a clear and present danger to social norms and values, and drastic action is taken to punish stigmatized targets (Cohen 1972). From the mass executions of witches in Renaissance Europe and Salem, Massachusetts (Ben-Yehuda 1980; Erikson 1966), to the violence and mass arrests in response to mods and rockers in London in the 1960s (Cohen 1972), to the sudden public distress over marijuana in the United States in the 1930s that resulted in stringent anti-marijuana laws (Becker 1963), moral panics are characterized by a scale-shift in their social consequences. Although accounts of moral panics claim that they have far-reaching effects, there is little research on how punitive action against a tiny group can have large spillover effects for a larger population.

We propose that stigma by mere association increases the number of individuals who are harmed in moral panics. Stigma is a flexible package of processes that include labeling, stereotyping, setting apart a group, and discriminating against group members (Link and Phelan 2001). These processes may unfold differently depending on whether partisans who perpetuate a stigma seek to dominate a group for economic benefits (e.g., slavery), to avoid disease (e.g., leprosy), or to increase conformity with norms (e.g., Salem witch hunts) (Phelan, Link, and Dovidio 2008). We focus on the third case, where stigma is constructed around voluntary behavior such as allegiance to an ideology.

We suggest that when partisans seek to increase conformity to one ideology, they attempt to stigmatize members of the rival ideology, labeling them as dangerous and stereotyping them as abnormal. If the public is receptive and perceives the stigmatized group as a threat, this can foster a moral panic. In the early stages of a moral panic, a small group is targeted for discrimination. This can take the form of direct punishment after public and dramatic deliberations. Subsequently, stigma by mere association, which hinges on automatic cognition, can expand the range of individuals who are discriminated against. We propose that such spillover effects occur when stigma is based on voluntary traits that are not readily detectable. In addition, we suggest that mere association will spread stigma for moral panics in labor markets where activists concerned about norm enforcement must rely on employers to control the levers of punishment. In turn, employers conform to strict definitions of ''normal'' for fear of being tarred by suspicion. When the stereotypes that discredit an ideological group become taken for granted, discrimination by employers becomes automatic so that even individuals with *mere* association to stigma can be adversely affected.

When stigma spreads through mere association, moral panics can quickly expand beyond activists' intentions and have uncontrollable consequences. For example, when drug use is uncovered in a sport, advertisers may pull sponsorship from all teams or even related sports. Or when companies are targeted as sweatshops, the taint could mistakenly spread to partners or suppliers who may have upstanding labor practices. Once stigma begins to spread through mere association, activists no longer can control who is affected; stigma can spread indiscriminately.

We offer three arguments for how stigma by mere association can propagate a moral panic. First, mere association can cause individuals to suffer from their affiliations, even if an affiliate is punished after the association occurred. This type of ex-post mere association casts a broad net of suspicion. Once a person is labeled as deviant, others stay away to avoid being named themselves. But if people are harmed because of past casual associations, then anyone can potentially experience damaging effects. Second, effects of stigma in moral panics expand when stigma by association flows through heterophilous affiliations (i.e., connections between dissimilar others). A canonical proposition in

diffusion research is that things spread when connections are homophilous and occur between similar individuals (Rogers 2003). Negative information, however, is diagnostically powerful and can traverse social divides (Rozin and Royzman 2001). Finally, conformity to norms is sustained when stigma by association strikes down high-status individuals who have won public acclaim and recognition, creating a broadcast effect.

We investigate these ideas in a study of the Red Scare in the Hollywood film industry from 1945 through 1960. We focus on the Red Scare for two reasons. First, it is a compelling example of a diffuse moral panic. Conservative artists and politicians worked in tandem to defend capitalism against communism; they stereotyped communists as unpatriotic and a danger to American society. Blacklisted artists were denied work because they were (suspected to be) subversive. Blacklisting was a bureaucratized and systematic process, where film producers appointed clearance officers to screen their employees. One might thus expect stigma-by-association effects to be minimal because individuals were carefully selected for blacklisting. Yet artists who had mere association with blacklisted individuals, and were not blacklisted themselves, had difficulty finding work in Hollywood. Second, despite the importance of blacklisting in U.S. social history, it has received little attention from sociologists (Ceplair and Englund 1979) and its social costs—in particular, damaged employment prospects for artists—have yet to be chronicled.

MORAL PANICS, NORM ENFORCEMENT, AND STIGMA BY ASSOCIATION

Moral panics arise when partisans perceive a threat to the social order and attempt to raise public consciousness to root out this threat. Partisans can be elites, general interest groups, or grassroots movements motivated by material and moral interests. In moral panics, strong boundaries are drawn between honest, law-abiding citizens and deviants who are characterized as intending to change people's lives for the worse. Members of the stigmatized group are constructed as ''folk devils''; they represent all that is evil and immoral in society (Cohen 1972). Censuring these individuals is seen as purging society of the wrongs they represent.

In moral panics, activists heighten the salience of certain stigmas by enforcing social norms and painting people who ascribe to subversive ideologies as dangerous. For example, Puritan religious leaders cultivated hysteria about witches in Salem and launched trials to denounce them (Erikson 1966). In fact, dominant groups often use political witch hunts to create stigma for the purpose of norm enforcement (Bergesen 1977). Prohibition in the United States during World War I was the result of a moral panic created by a grassroots social movement that played on fears of alcohol and German identity (Gusfield 1963). When a subpopulation is stigmatized as abnormal and a moral panic ensues, others will conform to accepted social norms to avoid being targeted.

The literature on stigma and moral panics emphasizes attributes that give rise to stigma and the activists or partisans who construct stigma to foster public fear. Unexplored, however, is how conformity spreads through an entire population when only a handful of individuals are directly targeted. We outline how, in a labor market, stigma by association is a mechanism by which direct punishment of a few affects many.

Mere Association

Goffman (1963) described courtesy stigma as a taint that afflicts individuals associated with others who are blemished by mental illness or disreputable occupations. Since then, laboratory studies have shown that stigma by

association is rampant (Burk and Sher 1990; Goldstein and Johnson 1997; Mehta and Farina 1998; Neuberg et al. 1994). Even arbitrary associations can transfer stigma—for example, sitting next to an obese female can result in lower expectations of whether a candidate would be acceptable for a job (Hebl and Mannix 2003). In conventional laboratory experiments, stigma spreads forward to an individual from another who is stigmatized ex-ante (e.g., the person is already obese or suffers from a disability). In such cases, an individual has information about the other and is perceived by audiences as choosing to affiliate with that person. Stigma by association can also propagate backward from an affiliate who is stigmatized ex-post. In this case of *mere* association, an individual lacks knowledge that the other will become stigmatized; these voluntary affiliations are based on imperfect information. When people can be stigmatized due to ex-post affiliations, the population adversely affected by courtesy stigma is likely to expand.

In moral panics that reinforce social norms, the relevant stigma is based on voluntary beliefs or behaviors that lack obvious observable traits. This makes it difficult to delineate boundaries between the stigmatized and the non-stigmatized. When partisans succeed in creating a stereotype against an ideological group, prejudice becomes automatic. Yet the difficulty in identifying discrediting markers induces a general aversion to any trace of association with the stigma. Employers are thus likely to deny employment to those with *mere* association to stigmatized individuals—people who would otherwise not be stigmatized. This leads to the first hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 1:* Mere association to stigmatized co-workers reduces the likelihood that an individual will find a job.

How ''mere'' must associations be to produce stigma? Effects of stigma by association are especially powerful because they persist after a single exposure. Risen, Gilovich, and Dunning (2007) found that juxtaposition of a group member with a rare behavior is sufficient to produce a one-shot illusory correlation and set the stage for more elaborate stereotyping. They concluded that a single action by minority group-members exerts disproportionate effects on judgment, not only because it is memorable, but because it triggers the attribution that group membership is responsible for the behavior. In the case of moral panics, a single association with individuals who are later stigmatized is enough to lead to aversion. This suggests a second hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2:* Mere association to a single stigmatized co-worker is enough to reduce the likelihood that an individual will find a job.

Heterophily in the Transmission of Stigma

Stigma by association propagates moral panic because it can spread through heterophily—that is, contact between dissimilar individuals. A staple proposition in diffusion research is that ideas and innovations spread through homophily (i.e., contact between individuals similar in race, gender, or roles) (Rogers 2003). Similarity fosters exchange, information sharing, and trust, and powers diffusion (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).

Conversely, stigma can spread through heterophily. Negative information is stronger than positive information and so can traverse social distances. Bad events, memories, odors, and relationships are more salient than good events, memories, odors, and relationships (Baumeister et al. 2001). For instance, in countries with caste systems, minimal contact with lower castes produces more contagion than does contact with higher castes (Meigs 1984). A negativity bias exists in social evaluations because negative events

are salient, yield complex representations, evoke wide repertoires, and are perceived to be more diagnostic than positive events (Rozin and Royzman 2001). Of course, there needs to be some similarity between individuals for there to be an association. We suggest, however, that stigma can transfer once there is any contact, even if the individuals are dissimilar on other dimensions. In the context of the film industry, professional roles define an important dimension of heterophily. This leads to the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Mere association to stigmatized co-workers who occupy dissimilar roles reduces the likelihood that an individual will find a job.

The Broadcast Effect of High-Status Victims

Moral panics thrive because stigma by association can harm even high-status and publicly acclaimed individuals. Merton (1968) suggested that graded rewards in science are distributed according to the coin of recognition. He called this the Matthew effect, which ''consists in the accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding of recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark'' (p. 62). Studies show that individuals with greater recognition receive more rewards than their less recognized peers for work of similar quality (Podolny 2005). Furthermore, high-status actors are often exempt from the harmful consequences of norm violations (Phillips and Zuckerman 2005). By this line of reasoning, public recognition should buffer the harmful effects of mere association with stigmatized others.

Are people who receive public recognition immune to the harmful effects of mere association with stigma? We argue no. In moral panics, deviance is assumed to lurk in all corners of the social fabric, and this assumption fosters widespread fear. Furthermore, the ''discovery'' that well-regarded individuals are part of the deviant group has a broadcast effect that reinforces concern and justifies a pervasive search. In the European witch craze, widows and spinsters were the initial victims, but social status and gender made little difference in later stages—eventually all women and men could be targeted (Ben-Yehuda 1980).

Greater recognition can magnify exposure to stigma by association, which operates through automatic cognition and relies on heuristics (Dovidio et al. 1997). One such heuristic is availability (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), wherein the more memorable and recent an event, the greater the recall. Individuals who occupy higher status positions attract more attention and represent more salient targets than do those with relatively invisible positions (Adut 2005; Fiske 1980). In this context, individuals who are publicly awarded recognition by an audience are likely to be available for stigmatization. Moreover, individuals with higher recognition also face higher expectations from audiences—the higher an actor's social position, the harder her fall. We thus hypothesize that recognition does not protect individuals from the harmful effects of mere association with stigmatized others:

Hypothesis 4: Mere association to stigmatized co-workers reduces the likelihood that an individual will find a job, even if the individual has received public recognition.

THE RED SCARE IN THE HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY, 1945 TO 1960

After World War II, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC)—a committee of the House of Representatives—started investigating threats of subversion in the

film industry. Some producers, actors, and writers collaborated with HUAC by providing names of alleged communists (Belfrage 1973). On September 21, 1947, HUAC issued subpoenas to 43 members of the Hollywood film industry, requiring them to appear as witnesses before the committee during its October hearings in Washington. When 10 of the subpoenaed refused to testify, they were cited for contempt of Congress and indicted. The event attracted vast attention, partly because a few were prominent artists. Writers Adrian Scott and Ring Lardner Jr. and director Edward Dmytryk all enjoyed high salaries and long-term contracts at major studios (Ceplair and Englund 1979). Later that year, studio executives assembled at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York and released a statement announcing that they had fired the Ten and would not rehire them until they recanted and cleared themselves with the committee.

The press, especially papers published by populist magnate William Hearst and an expanding number of anti-communist newsletters, demanded that Hollywood do more to eradicate subversive infiltration in its ranks. HUAC summoned many witnesses—some friendly, some unfriendly—who named Hollywood artists as affiliated with communist activities. The committee's 1952 and 1953 annual reports made public a list of more than 300 suspected film, radio, and television personalities, and the hearings continued until 1955 (Cogley 1956).

Blacklisting was a rationalized and bureaucratized process. Schrecker (1994) describes two stages of identification and elimination: political undesirables were detected by one agency and then fired by another (this division of operations made it easier for individuals doing the firing to deny they were accomplices in an inquisition). In the first stage, either the FBI or HUAC's investigating committee identified the undesirables. In June 1950, American Business Consultants (an outfit run by a trio of FBI agents and funded by Alfred Kohlberg and the Catholic Church) issued a 213-page book, *Red Channels* (1950), that inaugurated the ''graylist''—151 actors, writers, musicians, and other entertainers were named as communists on the basis of their ''Red connections'' (Ceplair and Englund 1979).

Employers were expected to be more involved in the second stage, which included an official clearance process (Navasky 1980): mistaken identities were corrected and alleged communists were allowed to repudiate their beliefs. Actors put on either the blacklist or the graylist faced identical consequences—they lost their jobs. The public supported blacklisting; for example, supermarket owners threatened to boycott films that featured communists. Laurence Johnson, a supermarket owner in Syracuse, New York, threatened to place signs in his stores warning customers not to buy products of any company that sponsored a program starring one of ''Stalin's little creatures.'' Because studios depended on banks for financing, and banks were leery of backing films likely to be boycotted, studio heads accepted the *Red Channels* guide, along with the list of names supplied by HUAC and Senator McCarthy's staff, as the basis for their blacklist.

As a member of the investigating committee indicated, Hollywood was an industry ''where livelihood depends on the attitude of the public toward a person's name'' (quoted in Cogley 1956:88). Actress Karen Morley explained that ''it was really murder to find work after being blacklisted, not just for me particularly but for all actors who were prominent, because their faces were well-known. I couldn't work anyplace where people might spot me. I couldn't even work as a saleslady in a fancy shop, for example, which I might have done in New York'' (Cogley 1956: 477). By fostering public support for the blacklist, government officials could influence Hollywood producers to enact punishment on people they named as communist.

Historians acknowledge that most artists called to testify before HUAC had active political pasts, but they note that the

industry's blacklists and graylists were indiscriminate. Artists in the film industry were targeted beyond the rational machine of the hearings; the ''people and organizations which assembled in HUAC's shadow threw their nets far wider than the Committee and obeyed far fewer rules'' (Ceplair and Englund 1979:388). For example, blacklisted actress Marsha Hunt was active in the Screen Actors Guild but never attended Party meetings. She described herself as politically ''innocent,'' ''not as a partisan political advocate'' but simply ''someone who cared about issues like fair housing'' (McGilligan and Buhle 1997:311).

Central to our interpretation of the Red Scare in Hollywood as a moral panic is the idea that there was a large increase in public anxiety over the threat posed by communists in Hollywood (Ben-Yehuda 1980). Although partisans maintained that the threat of communist infiltration in Hollywood was grave, the Communist Party was never large enough to be a menace to U.S. security; in fact, the party was in decline as the moral panic mounted (Ceplair and Englund 1979). Three factors strengthened activists' ability to convince the public that communists in Hollywood posed a grave threat to national security. First, the blacklist occurred in the midst of the Cold War, when the public was already afraid of the Soviet threat. Second, the labels ''Communist,'' ''Red,'' ''liberal,'' ''labor,'' and ''union'' became associated with immorality and danger. As Marsha Hunt's case suggests, even weak associations with communism were demonized (this is consistent with Cohen's [1972] description of folk devils as stereotypes). Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958:57) note that in the decade after World War II, charges of subversion against teachers were also made on the basis of very weak associations: ''An individual could be called a communist for almost any kind of behavior, or for holding almost any kind of attitude'' that ''suggested a criticism of any American institution.'' Third, although blacklisting violated worker protections, discredited artists did not receive support from their guilds, so there was no systematic effort to counter the stereotype. The stigma of communism was not associated with obvious traits that could help identify members of the tainted group. In addition, studios, rather than anti-communist activists, punished blacklisted artists. These conditions set the stage for stigma by mere association to expand the number of individuals harmed.

The Red Scare effectively ended in 1960. In 1959, screenwriter Dalton Trumbo revealed that he was behind the pseudonym ''Robert Rich'' on the film *The Brave One* (1957). His announcement was made after another blacklisted writer, Nedrick Young, had declared he was the ''Nathan E. Douglas'' who wrote the script for *The Defiant Ones* (the film had been made in 1956 but was released almost three years later). *The Defiant Ones* was favored to win a screenwriting Oscar for ''Douglas'' and his coauthor Harold J. Smith, which would have overturned the rule disqualifying Fifth Amendment witnesses from Academy Award consideration.

DATA AND METHODS

We gathered data on the Hollywood film industry from 1945 to 1960. The primary source is the American Film Institute Catalog of Motion Pictures (AFI 1999), which provides names of all cast members, artistic and technical, credited for work on a feature film. We use these data to construct career histories for every artist who worked on at least one feature film. The analysis includes all feature films produced and released in the United States and focuses on individuals who held four key roles and the respective titles: director (director and 2nd unit director), writer (screenwriter, writer, treatment, story, script, and dialogue), producer (producer, associate producer, executive producer, and presenter), and actor (the first 50 credited names). We exclude films produced and released for

noncommercial purposes, imported films, and short films.

Dependent and Independent Variables

We investigate whether stigma by mere association harmed job prospects by estimating the likelihood that an individual received employment. The primary dependent variable is an artist-year binary variable equal to 1 when a focal artist gained film employment in the next year, and 0 otherwise (Bielby and Bielby 1999; Zuckerman et al. 2003).

The independent variables are mere association with blacklisted artists and whether an artist won an Oscar or worked in at least one film among the 10 largest box-office rentals each year. ''Blacklisted artists'' are individuals whose names HUAC leaked to the press or who were listed in *Red Channels,* the unofficial ''Bible'' of alleged communist sympathizers (these lists come from Vaughn [2004] and *Red Channels* [1950]). Data on Oscar winners come from Shale (1993) (they are also available from the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences' Web site, http://www.oscar.com) and data on film rentals come from *Variety* magazine's lists of ''All-Time Film Rental Champs.''

In considering *mere association*, the risk set does not include artists who were themselves blacklisted. In some cases, artists worked with another artist who had *already* been blacklisted. These cases do not constitute mere association because the artist had ex-ante information, so they are excluded. Artist A has mere association with blacklisted artist B at time t if A and B worked in (at least) one film together prior to time t_i and B was blacklisted at time t_i.

To test Hypothesis 1, we define mere association with blacklisted artists as the number of artists who worked with the focal artist and who were blacklisted *after* having worked with the focal artist. To test Hypothesis 2 (i.e., whether a single mere association with blacklisted artists is enough to lead to discrimination), the risk set includes only those artists with mere association of one—that is, artists who have been in a movie with only one person subsequently blacklisted. For Hypothesis 3, which examines whether mere association passes through heterophilous ties, we capture role dissimilarity by measuring mere association between a focal actor and blacklisted writers as opposed to actors. To investigate whether publicly recognized artists are harmed by mere association with stigmatized others, we use two measures of public recognition: box office success and Oscar wins. The first model uses two variables: (1) mere association with blacklisted individuals for artists who worked in a top-10 box-office rental film and (2) mere association with blacklisted individuals for all other artists. The second model uses two variables: (1) mere association with stigmatized individuals for artists who won an Oscar and (2) mere association with blacklisted individuals for all other artists. We can then compare the effects of mere association with stigmatized individuals for publicly recognized and critically acclaimed artists versus all other artists.

The data cover 5,712 films released between 1945 and 1960. From these films, 267 cast members were officially blacklisted; 31,781 cast members were neither blacklisted nor worked in a film with an artist who had already been blacklisted. We test our hypotheses on this second set of artists. The estimate of whether an artist was employed in a given year starts when the artist enters the risk set (i.e., first works in a film). The unit of analysis is the artist-year, and there are 297,444 artist-year spells in our data. Of the 31,781 artists, 10,274 had mere association with blacklisted individuals.

Control Variables

We include several control variables to account for characteristics that influence the probability of artists finding gainful employment. First, we control for how central artists

are in their networks. More central artists have more connections and should have more opportunities for employment. We use the number of total connections to other artists, defined as the number of artists with whom the focal artist worked in the past, as a proxy for centrality. We use the number of total films an artist previously worked in as a measure of perceived skill. Publicly recognized artists are more likely to gain employment; we thus include the number of Oscar wins an artist received, the number of Oscar-winning films an artist appeared in, and the number of top-10 rental films an artist worked in. We include a variable measuring the number of years spent without working in film to control for biases in access to the job market. If an artist's past co-workers are unemployed, it might be more difficult for the focal artist to find work. We therefore include a control for average unemployment duration of past co-workers. We also control for an artist's tenure, using the number of years since 1945 an artist had worked in the film industry (Bielby and Bielby 1999). In supplementary analyses, we include tenure from the beginning of an artist's career as a control for the subset of artists who have that information available.

We account for career specialism in film genres; because specialists have focused identities, they may have an easier time finding work (see Zuckerman at al. 2003). We coded data on genre classification for all films in the sample using the Internet Movie Database's classification (http://www.imdb.com). We calculate genre concentration scores for artists as a Hirschman-Herfindahl index of roles by genre (films can be categorized under multiple genres; we use only the primary genre to calculate the concentration scores [Zuckerman et al. 2003]). Previous research shows that veteran actors benefit less from focused careers because employers interpret participation in multiple categories as a signal of broad skills rather than a lack of skills (Zuckerman et al. 2003). We thus include an interaction term between genre specialism and the number of films in which an artist worked to account for effects of specialism. Data include all cast members from all feature films released between 1945 and 1960 and track the many artists who appear in only one feature length film. We add a dichotomous variable as a control for artists who worked in only one film, in case these artists were systematically less likely to receive employment. We include another dichotomous variable to account for actors who worked in films produced by one of the major Hollywood studios (i.e., Columbia Pictures, 20th Century-Fox, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount, RKO, United Artists, Universal Pictures, and Warner Bros.). As a proxy for an artist's affiliation with a major studio, we employ a dummy equal to 1 if an artist made at least one film produced by a major studio in the previous year.

We also take into account a number of macro-level control variables. We include the calendar year, as well as yearly measures of number of films produced, number of producer organizations, attendance in theaters (in millions), and television advertising (in million dollars) to account for the availability of job opportunities for artists. (All results are robust to estimations that use year dummies instead of calendar year and industry descriptors.) AFI provides film release dates, which we use to calculate the number of films made each year. Calculation of the number of producing organizations is based on a reconstruction of life histories through the release dates of films made by each organization. (Producer organizations enter the population with release of their first film; they exit it the first day following the release date of their last film.) Data for film attendance and television advertising come from Quigley's *Motion Picture Almanac* and the *Television Factbook*. Artists who combine roles obtain preferential access to social and material capital, which influences their career opportunities (Baker and Faulkner 1991). We include controls for whether an artist worked as an actor, director, producer, or writer; artists who integrated roles are the reference group.

All measures are lagged by one year. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables.

Model

We use weighted logit models to estimate the odds that an artist receives employment in a given year. The biggest threat to the validity of any analysis claiming causal effects is the nonrandom selection of individuals into a treatment group. For example, one might argue that closeted communist artists may be more likely to have worked with someone who is later blacklisted. One way we address this issue is by using the inverse probability of treatment weighted (IPTW) method (Hernán, Brumback, and Robins 2001; Robins, Hernán, and Brumback 2000) to create artist specific weights. This method helps address whether artists self-select into having mere association with stigmatized individuals. IPTW models invoke counterfactual methods of inference and assume that each individual in a population has two potential outcomes: she can select into the treatment condition or the control condition. Only one of these outcomes is observed. The likelihood that a subject will select into the treatment condition is estimated given the subject's prior history, time-varying, and time-invariant covariates. Each subject is then weighted by the inverse of the probability that she will select into treatment. Issues of causality are thus treated as a ''missing data problem'' of the unobserved counterfactual (Winship and Morgan 1999).

For IPTW, when the treatment, the confounding covariates, and the outcome vary over time, estimates can be biased. To address this, following Robins and colleagues (2000), we use stabilized weights, where the denominator is the probability that a subject received his observed treatment at time t given past treatment and covariate history, and the numerator is the probability that the subject received the past treatment history without adjusting for covariate history. To compute the stabilized weights, we estimate the odds that an artist will have mere association to a blacklisted other using the control variables listed above and a series of variables that indicate whether an artist was likely to have communist leanings. The dependent variable in this equation is a dummy that is 1 when an artist's previous co-worker is blacklisted; it is 0 if the artist was not affiliated with any blacklisted individuals. We use membership in the Communist Party or several arts and labor organizations perceived to be part of the communist front as indicator variables. We obtained data on these organizations' membership from the *Red Channels* guide and FBI reports on communist infiltration in the motion picture industry (COMPIC) (information in the FBI reports was classified at the time but released after the Freedom of Information Act in 1966). If there is self-selection into having mere association to stigmatized others, members of these organizations would most likely select into that condition. We include indicators for membership in 17 communist and communist-front organizations. To determine the stabilized weights, we estimate two equations, one with control variables only and one with control and indicator variables (Robins et al. 2000). We calculate the weight as the inverse probability an artist selects into the treatment condition using the controls-only estimate divided by the inverse probability the artist selects into the treatment condition using the indicator variables estimate.

To test the hypotheses, we then include these weights for each artist i in each year t in logit models (IPTW logit models). The models have the following form:

$$k = \log \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} = \alpha + X'\beta$$

where k represents the linear transformation of the log of the probability, π, of the dependent variable occurring, divided by the probability of it not occurring. We estimate this

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis of Film Careers; Artists in Hypothesis Testing Risk Set (N = 297,444)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Artist is in a film in the current year	.1259	.3317	0	1
Mere association with blacklisted artists	.8104	2.288	0	47
One mere association with a blacklisted artist	.2661	.4419	0	1
Mere association with blacklisted artists for artists in top-10 films	.2244	1.618	0	45
Mere association with blacklisted artists for artists not in top-10 films	.586	1.696	0	47
Mere association with blacklisted artists for Oscar winners	.0086	.2702	0	19
Mere association with blacklisted artists for non-Oscar winners	.8018	2.275	0	47
Mere association with blacklisted actors	.5033	1.520	0	34
Mere association with blacklisted writers	.2297	.7762	0	21
Mere association with blacklisted artists for anti-communist cast	.03	.608	0	45
Mere association with blacklisted artists for non-anti-communist cast	.78	2.216	0	47
Time discounted mere association with blacklisted artists	.4502	1.410	0	45
Number of connections to other artists	95	172	0	3717
Number of connections to other actors	83	149	0	3245
Number of connections to other writers	.2297	.7762	0	21
Number of total films	2.565	4.734	0	102
Number of Oscar wins	.0041	.0658	0	2
Number of Oscar-winning films artist was in	.0088	.0932	0	1
Number of top-10 films artist was in	.095	.362	0	9
Duration of unemployment	3.229	3.566	0	14
Average unemployment duration of previous co-workers	1.787	1.987	0	14
Tenure	5.119	4.051	0	15
Genre specialization	.7145	.3674	0	1
Genre specialization × Number of total films	1.542	2.542	0	95
In only one film	.5234	.4995	0	1
Association with major studio	.3889	.4875	0	1
Year	10.08	4.207	1	16
Number of films produced	342	63.81	228	424
Number of producer organizations	140	22.90	89	173
Attendance in theaters	48.33	15.91	28	85
TV advertising	836	563	0	1590
Actor	.8326	.3734	0	1
Director	.0167	.1281	0	1
Writer	.0817	.274	0	1
Producer	.0559	.2298	0	1

with α as the constant, X' as a matrix of covariates, and β as a matrix of the estimated coefficients of those covariates. Because the data are clustered by artist, we use a robust variance estimator in Stata 9.0 to account for the non-independence of observations.

RESULTS

Table 2 reports results testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. These are IPTW logit models estimating the odds of an actor finding work in a given year. All covariates are lagged by one year.

Table 2. IPTW Logit Models of the Likelihood of Finding Work; Effects of Mere Association to Stigmatized Artists

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	DV: Artist is in film		
Mere association with blacklisted artists		−.1446***	
		(.0058)	
One mere association with a blacklisted artist			−.1681***
			(.0307)
Number of connections to other artists	.0005+	.0026***	.0024***
	(.0003)	(.0003)	(.0003)
Number of total films	.1864***	.1691***	.4550***
	(.0146)	(.0150)	(.0222)
Number of Oscar wins	.6338***	.6505***	.6342***
	(.0904)	(.0928)	(.1056)
Number of Oscar-winning films artist was in	−.0133	.1048	.0342
	(.0814)	(.0813)	(.1087)
Number of top-10 films artist was in	.0888***	.0838***	.0782**
	(.0252)	(.0250)	(.0287)
Duration of unemployment	−.3413***	−.3309***	−.2941***
	(.0088)	(.0086)	(.0102)
Average unemployment duration of previous co-workers	−.4218***	−.4091***	−.2732***
	(.0263)	(.0251)	(.0252)
Tenure	.0945***	.1070***	.0184*
	(.0086)	(.0084)	(.0081)
Genre specialization	2.868***	2.824***	3.505***
	(.0479)	(.0478)	(.0490)
Genre specialization × Number of total films	−.2195***	−.2402***	−.5289***
	(.0131)	(.0133)	(.0198)
In only one film	−1.781***	−1.698***	−1.713***
	(.0313)	(.0313)	(.0326)
Association with major studio	.4131***	.3639***	.2133***
	(.0193)	(.0186)	(.0194)
Year	.3109***	.3995***	.4001***
	(.0308)	(.0316)	(.0366)
Number of films produced	.0038***	.0047***	.0039***
	(.0002)	(.0002)	(.0003)
Number of producer organizations	.0060***	.0035***	.0043***
	(.0003)	(.0004)	(.0004)
Attendance in theaters	.0879***	.1046***	.1214***
	(.0057)	(.0058)	(.0067)
TV advertising	−.0003***	−.0004***	.0001
	(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0001)
Actor	−.4495***	−.4663***	−.3727***
	(.0547)	(.0545)	(.0583)
Director	.0168	.0088	.0747
	(.0746)	(.0746)	(.0777)
Writer	−.3688***	−.3732***	−.2793***
	(.0591)	(.0588)	(.0627)
Producer	−.1756**	−.1672**	−.1157+
	(.0622)	(.0622)	(.0662)
Constant	−11.93***	−13.66***	−15.35***
	(.5755)	(.5899)	(.6820)
Log pseudolikelihood	−79592.13	−78857.14	−62756.57
Number of observations	297,444	297,444	252,871
Degrees of freedom	21	22	22

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
+$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

We ran these models on the set of artists who were not blacklisted and who did not work in a film with someone already blacklisted.

Model 1 in Table 2 shows the effects of control variables. Prior connections, prior number of films in which an artist worked, number of Oscar wins, and number of top-10 films in which an artist worked significantly increase the odds of employment in the next year. This shows that more central and prominent artists are more likely to find employment. (The number of Oscar-winning films in which an artist worked does not have a significant effect, likely due to overlap with artists' Oscar wins and having worked in a box-office champion film.) Artists who were unemployed for a long time, and those with networks of co-workers who were unemployed for a long time, are less likely to find work. Lower skilled artists may have a hard time finding employment, especially when their connections are also unemployed. Tenure has a positive effect on unemployment, indicating that, controlling for unemployment duration, experienced artists are more likely to find work. Model 10 includes tenure over an artist's career, which has a negative and significant effect on employment. We believe this discrepancy is because tenure from the inception of an artist's career captures artists who can no longer viably find work.

Consistent with Zuckerman and colleagues (2003), we find that specialists gain more employment and more experienced artists benefit less from genre specialism. Artists who have worked in only one film are less likely to gain employment, which may be an indicator of low skill. As expected, studio affiliates have higher odds of employment. The number of films produced, number of producer organizations, and attendance in theaters boost chances of employment. On average, actors, writers, and producers have lower chances of finding employment than do those who perform multiple roles; this finding is compatible with previous studies of role integration (Baker and Faulkner 1991).

Effects of mere association with stigmatized others. Model 2 finds that mere association with stigma will harm an artist's chances of finding work; this supports Hypothesis 1. If one previous co-worker is later blacklisted, an artist's odds of working in subsequent years are reduced by 13 percent. Figure 1 illustrates this effect. Model 2 also shows a significant ($p < .001$) improvement in fit over Model 1.

Effects of single exposure to stigmatized others. Model 3 tests Hypothesis 2 using the set of artists who have mere association of 0 or 1—that is, they either did not work with someone who was later blacklisted, or they worked with only one person who was later blacklisted. Artists drop out of the risk set once they have mere association of more than 1; thus, there are fewer artist-year spells in this model. Results show that one mere association with a blacklisted artist has a negative and significant ($p < .001$) effect on the odds of working; this supports Hypothesis 2. Model 3 shows a significant ($p < .001$) improvement in fit over a base model of controls only, run on the subset of respective artists.

Effects of role dissimilarity. Table 3 reports results for Hypotheses 3 and 4. Model 4 tests Hypothesis 3, which argues that mere association with stigmatized individuals who occupy dissimilar roles will harm an artist's career prospects. We test this hypothesis for actors, who are the majority of artists in these data. Because films are generally cast by producers and directors, actors and writers have the least amount of role interdependence. Therefore, we separately compute each actor's mere association with other actors or writers who were later blacklisted. Note that films employing blacklisted writers are not more communist in nature: a study analyzing the content of films in which blacklisted writers received



Figure 1. Odds of Working in Film by Mere Association with Blacklisted Artists

credits found no communist propaganda (Jones 1956).

Model 4 shows a significant ($p < .001$) improvement in fit over a base model that includes controls only, run on the same subset of artists. Appearing in a film with an actor who is later blacklisted reduces an actor's chances of working again by 13 percent, from the time of blacklisting. If a film's writer was subsequently blacklisted, an actor's odds of working again are reduced by 20 percent. Figure 2 also shows the effect of mere association with stigmatized actors and writers on the odds that an actor will work again. Exposure to stigmatized actors and writers decreases the odds that an actor will work again, and proximity to an additional stigmatized writer has a stronger effect than proximity to a stigmatized actor. These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.

Effects of public recognition. Next we test Hypothesis 4, that mere association with stigmatized others reduces the chances a focal artist will work again, even for publicly recognized artists. Models 5 and 6 use two measures of public recognition: having worked in a top-10 box-office hit (recognition by the ''outsider'' audience of moviegoers) and having won an Oscar (recognition by ''insiders'' who determine artistic achievement). The models show a significant ($p < .001$) improvement in fit over Model 1, which includes controls only.

Model 5 separates the effect of mere association for artists who worked in top-10 box-office rental films versus those who did not. We find that top-10 box-office film casts are *more* susceptible to harmful effects of mere association with stigmatized others. An artist in a top-10 box-office film who has mere association of 1 to a stigmatized other is 16 percent less likely to work again; an artist who was not in a top-10 box-office film and has the same mere association of 1 is only 11 percent less likely to subsequently work. Model 6 shows that Oscar winners were also susceptible to adverse effects of stigma by mere association. Unlike artists in top-10 box-office films, however, Oscar winners were buffered from the harmful effects that arise from mere association with stigmatized others. Oscar winners with mere association of 1 to a stigmatized other reduce their chances of working again by 9 percent. Artists who did not win an Oscar, but have the same mere association, reduce their odds of working by 14 percent. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the effects reported in Models 5 and 6.

Table 3. IPTW Logit Models of the Likelihood of Finding Work; Effects of Role Dissimilarity and Public Recognition

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	DV: Actor is in a film	DV: Artist is in a film All Artists	
Mere association with blacklisted actors	−.1424***		
	(.0104)		
Mere association with blacklisted writers	−.2232***		
	(.0188)		
Number of connections to other actors	.0014***		
	(.0003)		
Number of connections to other writers	.0174***		
	(.0028)		
Mere association with blacklisted artists for artists in top-10 films		−.1751***	
		(.0082)	
Mere association with blacklisted artists for artists not in top-10 films		−.1153***	
		(.0087)	
Mere association with blacklisted artists for Oscar winners			−.0969***
			(.0243)
Mere association with blacklisted artists for non-Oscar winners			−.1457***
			(.0059)
Number of connections to other artists		.0026***	.0026***
		(.0003)	(.0003)
Number of total films	.1803***	.1698***	.1693***
	(.0194)	(.0152)	(.0150)
Number of Oscar wins	1.075***	.6565***	.5496***
	(.1402)	(.0930)	(.1060)
Number of Oscar-winning films artist was in	.1421+	.1117	.1042
	(.0855)	(.0802)	(.0813)
Number of top-10 films artist was in	.0889**	.1770***	.0822**
	(.0278)	(.0268)	(.0250)
Duration of unemployment	−.3328***	−.3304***	−.3306***
	(.0098)	(.0087)	(.0086)
Average unemployment duration of previous co-workers	−.4252***	−.4007***	−.4091***
	(.0294)	(.0252)	(.0251)
Tenure	.1096***	.0999***	.1069***
	(.0093)	(.0087)	(.0084)
Genre specialization	2.878***	2.840***	2.825***
	(.0561)	(.0490)	(.0478)
Genre specialization × Number of total films	−.2441***	−.2421***	−.2406***
	(.0166)	(.0136)	(.0133)
In only one film	−1.760***	−1.696***	−1.698***
	(.0362)	(.0313)	(.0313)
Association with major studio	.3746***	.3551***	.3636***
	(.0206)	(.0187)	(.0186)
Year	.4291***	.3907***	.3997***
	(.0355)	(.0316)	(.0316)
Number of films produced	.0046***	.0046***	.0047***
	(.0003)	(.0002)	(.0002)
Number of producer organizations	.0036***	.0037***	.0035***
	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0004)
Attendance in theaters	.1139***	.1037***	.1046***
	(.0066)	(.0059)	(.0058)

(continued)

Table 3. *Continued*

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	DV: Actor is in a film	DV: Artist is in a film All Artists	
TV advertising	−.0003**	−.0003***	−.0004***
	(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0001)
Actor		−.4649***	−.4683***
		(.0543)	(.0544)
Director		.0072	.0057
		(.0745)	(.0745)
Writer		−.3680***	−.3735***
		(.0587)	(.0587)
Producer		−.1646**	−.1686**
		(.0619)	(.0620)
Constant	−14.90***	−13.57***	−13.66***
	(.6617)	(.5902)	(.5900)
Log pseudolikelihood	−63051.36	−78792.90	−78853.86
Number of observations	247,641	297,444	297,444
Degrees of freedom	20	23	23

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
$+p < .10$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Consistent with Hypothesis 4, mere association with stigmatized others harms even publicly recognized artists' career chances. We cannot predict, however, whether recognition reduces or exaggerates the harmful effects. Results indicate that arguments for both sides may be correct; it might depend on the type of recognition an individual received. The difference in effects may result from whether public recognition is measured by affiliation with a film or by individual acclaim, or it may reflect differences in receiving acclaim from different audiences. Commercial success can be volatile and more influenced by emotional reactions, while peers presumably reward perceived quality more consistently.

Alternative Explanations

Do effects of stigma by mere association mean that communists were more likely to work together? One could argue that artists with positive mere association to stigma—those who worked with people who were later blacklisted—were more likely to *be* communist. We address this possibility in three ways.

First, if stigma by mere association is a measure of an artist's communist tendencies, then artists with stigma by mere association should be more likely to be blacklisted. We test this using an IPTW logit model where the dependent variable is whether an artist was named on the blacklist. Model 7 in Table 4 presents the results. Mere association with stigmatized others has a negative and significant ($p < .05$) effect on the odds of being blacklisted. This implies that individuals with communist leanings may have avoided working with other communists. Model 7 includes membership in relevant communist-affiliated organizations tracked by the FBI. As expected, all of these membership dummies have significant positive effects on the probability of being blacklisted, but stigma by mere association does not (the effect holds even when the model is estimated without organizational affiliations).

Second, if stigma by mere association is an indicator of an artist's likelihood to be



Figure 2. Odds of Working by Mere Association with Stigmatized Artists, for Artists in Top-10 Films versus Those Not in Top-10 Films



Figure 3. Odds of Working by Mere Association with Stigmatized Artists, For Oscar Winners versus Non-Oscar Winners

communist, then its hazardous effects should not extend to artists at the other end of the ideological spectrum. We test whether mere association with blacklisted individuals harmed artists who appeared in anti-communist films listed in Cogley (1956). We use an IPTW logit model where the dependent variable is odds of employment (Model 1 is the base model). Results, presented in Model 8 in Table 4, show that mere association to blacklisted individuals reduced the odds of employment for anti-communist casts. There is no statistical difference between this effect and the effect on non-anti-communist casts.

Finally, as discussed earlier, IPTW models weight subjects by their propensity to select into a treatment condition, creating a counterfactual pseudo-population that approximates random assignment. IPTW models take into account an artist's propensity

Table 4. IPTW Logit Models of Likelihood of being Blacklisted and Finding Work (supplementary analysis); Effects of Mere Association to Stigmatized Individuals

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
	DV: Artist is blacklisted	DV: Artist is in film		
Mere association with blacklisted artists	−.1528*			−.1274***
	(.0640)			(.0066)
Member of Hollywood writers mobilization association	6.895***			
	(.9460)			
Member of independent citizens committee association	7.676***			
	(.4438)			
Member of communist political association	2.754***			
	(.4545)			
Member of Communist Party USA	2.551***			
	(.4848)			
Mere association with blacklisted artists for anti-communist cast		−.1222***		
		(.0161)		
Mere association with blacklisted artists for non-anti-communist cast		−.1465***		
		(.0059)		
Time discounted mere association with blacklisted artists			−.1309***	
			(.0086)	
Number of connections to other artists	.0065***	.0026***	.0014***	.0027***
	(.0016)	(.0003)	(.0003)	(.0004)
Number of total films	−.2147**	.1678***	.1764***	.1463***
	(.0683)	(.0151)	(.0148)	(.0194)
Number of Oscar wins	.7284+	.6496***	.6424***	.7439***
	(.4016)	(.0927)	(.0912)	(.1167)
Number of Oscar-winning films artist was in	1.538**	.0993	.0515	.1300
	(.4422)	(.0809)	(.0813)	(.0975)
Number of top-10 films artist was in	−.3845	.0847**	.0848**	.0790*
	(.2997)	(.0250)	(.0253)	(.0309)
Duration of unemployment	−.0597	−.3307***	−.3362***	−.2636***
	(.0814)	(.0086)	(.0088)	(.0128)
Average unemployment duration of previous co-workers	−.4338*	−.4086***	−.4346***	−.2553***
	(.2425)	(.0251)	(.0264)	(.0255)
Tenure (since 1945)	−.0900	.1070***	.1004***	
	(.0663)	(.0083)	(.0087)	
Tenure (since beginning of career)				−.0038**
				(.0015)
Age				−.0050***
				(.0010)
Genre specialization	−.5351	2.822***	2.851***	2.918***
	(.3628)	(.0479)	(.0481)	(.0708)
Genre specialization × Number of total films	.0067	−.2394***	−.2265***	−.2136***
	(.0681)	(.0134)	(.0132)	(.0161)
In only one film	−.6049*	−1.697***	−1.756***	−1.514***
	(.3046)	(.0313)	(.0313)	(.0499)
Association with major studio	.2516	.3639***	.3986***	.4865***
	(.1994)	(.0186)	(.0191)	(.0288)
Year	−.0132	.4002***	.3695***	.5440***
	(.6446)	(.0316)	(.0312)	(.0473)

(continued)

Table 4. *Continued*

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
	DV: Artist is blacklisted	DV: Artist is in film		
Number of films produced	.0171***	.0047***	.0044***	.0052***
	(.0041)	(.0002)	(.0002)	(.0004)
Number of producer organizations	−.0625***	.0035***	.0043***	.0045***
	(.0067)	(.0004)	(.0003)	(.0005)
Attendance in theaters	−.4237**	.1046***	.0961***	.1241***
	(.1341)	(.0058)	(.0058)	(.0087)
TV advertising	−.0076***	−.0004***	−.0004***	−.0007***
	(.0021)	(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0001)
Actor	−1.835***	−.4670***	−.4587***	−.1460
	(.3441)	(.0545)	(.0546)	(.1240)
Director	.2518	.0076	.0110	.3881*
	(.4492)	(.0746)	(.0746)	(.1776)
Writer	.5521	−.3740***	−.3744***	−.2907
	(.3371)	(.0588)	(.0590)	(.1879)
Producer	−1.032*	−.1677**	−.1720**	.1472
	(.4486)	(.0622)	(.0623)	(.2175)
Constant	23.40+	−13.67***	−12.85***	−15.45***
	(12.52)	(.5899)	(.5825)	(.8795)
Log pseudolikelihood	−1156.73	−78853.3	−79387.38	−32150.10
Number of observations	297,444	297,444	297,444	76,497
Degrees of freedom	26	23	22	23

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
$+p < .10$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

to have mere association to blacklisted others based on his past memberships. Using IPTW models, we find strong harmful effects due to stigma by mere association.

Do artists with stigma by mere association have a poor network of affiliates? The harmful effects of stigma by mere association could be driven by unemployment in a focal artist's network of past co-workers. Because blacklisted artists could not find work, individuals with past associations to blacklisted artists would also have past associations to unemployed artists. The model specifications include a control variable that measures the average unemployment duration of past co-workers in an artist's network, and effects of stigma by association are robust to its inclusion.

Do the effects of stigma by association persist over time? Model 9 in Table 4 tests this idea by including a time-decay measure of mere association to blacklisted individuals (i.e., time discounted mere association with blacklisted artists). We divide the number of past affiliations with blacklisted individuals by the (square root of the) number of years since the artist worked with the stigmatized others. If recent affiliations are more detrimental than distant-past affiliations, this measure should have a much stronger adverse effect on an artist's odds of employment. Model 9 shows, however, that both the magnitude and significance of the time-discounted covariate is similar to the effect of stigma by mere association in Model 2, where there is no time discount. We also included the ''difference'' term (models not shown) between mere association and time-discounted mere association, and we do not find that recent exposure is more consequential. These results

indicate that harmful effects of stigma by association persist, at least in the period covered by these data.

Do effects result from censoring in career history? To address this possibility, we include effects of actor age, death, and tenure since career inception on the subset of data for which we have this information. We collected information on artists' birth dates, death dates, and first film dates (available on the IMDB Web site). Model 10 re-runs Model 2 on the subset of artists for which IMDB provides dates, including controls for actor age and industry tenure measured from an artist's first film, and removing artists from the risk set after death. Model 10 shows that results are robust to these inclusions. Mere association to blacklisted actors and writers reduces the likelihood an actor will work again.

DISCUSSION

This article began with a simple question: If very few film artists were blacklisted, how did the Red Scare have such widespread effects in Hollywood? We suggested that stigma readily transmits through casual associations. Stigma by mere association can thus facilitate the propagation of moral panic. Most work on moral panics emphasizes the impact of public, dramaturgical factors and the role of reputational entrepreneurs. By contrast, we emphasize the automatic and micro-level process by which demonization of a small group can lead to widespread discrimination. The thinnest of social connections with the stigmatized was enough to damage artists' careers. This uncontrollable process fosters anxiety, leading to broader discrimination. We find that guilt by association can have spillover punitive effects on a wide swath of the labor market.

When a moral panic erupts around a voluntary stigma that is hard to detect, stigma by association makes activists lose control over who is harmed. This might be acceptable to activists, or even preferable, if they are aiming for widespread social control. In other cases, moral entrepreneurs might want the punishment for violating social norms to be specific and targeted. For example, a group boycotting a specific international firm to protest unfair labor practices may not want harmful effects to spread to partner organizations that have not engaged in any wrongdoing. Once a moral panic spirals out of the original advocates' control, not only can the wrong people be targeted, but the net of suspicion may be cast too broadly, leading to reduced public support for the cause. Our findings indicate that because of stigma by mere association, organized efforts can generate unanticipated consequences (Merton 1936).

This study also contributes to the literature on stigma, which has been dominated by social psychological studies conducted in the laboratory (Link and Phelan 2001). In general, these studies show that casual associations can be conduits for the spread of courtesy stigma, or stigma by association (Hebl and Mannix 2003; Neuberg et al. 1994). Laboratory studies, however, say little about how stigma by association can create social control in polities (Becker 1963). Our findings help explain why, even though a very small fraction of Hollywood artists were directly targeted for blacklisting, many more were victims through stigma by association. This process had many false positives—and these false positives created further panic that allowed conservative politicians to exact compliance from a large sector of the economy. We looked at one aspect of compliance, excluding people from jobs, but there were others too—films that might have been critical of America were not made; films that took a positive view of American power were made.

Furthermore, this study addresses an imbalance in economic sociology. Too often, economic sociologists emphasize the positive side of the social ledger at the expense of the negative side, by showing how social ties

provide social capital (Burt 2005) and signal social status (Podolny 2005). Neglect of the negative side seems all the more striking because negative relationships have stronger effects on individuals and organizations than do positive relationships (Rozin and Royzman 2001). Stigma is remarkable precisely because superficial associations are adequate for its transmission. These casual relationships cannot be construed as signals because they are inexpensive, not under the control of actors, and entail little voluntary choice. We find that mere association with stigma is enough to trigger discrimination in labor markets. To date, much research shows how candidates' demographic characteristics trigger discrimination—thus, criminals (Pager and Quillian 2005), African Americans (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), and mothers (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007) have trouble finding jobs. We demonstrate the significance of discrimination by association, which can extend beyond moral panics. Prospective candidates are evaluated not only on the basis of their individual features, but also on factors beyond their control—mere associations with previous co-workers.

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